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Fichte and Kant on Reason’s Final
Ends and Highest Ideas
Steven Hoeltzel
1 The Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte states in the 1797 Second Introduction, is a philosophy that “is
in  complete  accord  with  Kant’s  and  is  nothing  other  than  the  Kantian  philosophy
properly understood” (IWL, 52; GA I/4, 221). Later in the same essay, he singles out, as a
focal point of his own position,  “the I  as an Idea” (IWL, 100;  GA I/4,  265).  Not to be
confused with the I “as an intellectual intuition,” with which the Wissenschaftslehre is said
to commence (ibid.), this Idea of the I, in which the system is said to culminate, indicates
the essence of  reason or  of  the rational  being qua rational:  “Das  Ich,  als  Idee,  ist  das
VernunftWesen” (GA I/4, 266). On Kant’s account, of course, reason’s most basic aims and
operations  engender  not  one  but  three  systematically  central  Ideas,  each  of  which
represents an entity that transcends any possible experience, and all  of which play a
privileged (but not always unproblematic) role in orienting properly rational cognition
and volition. These are the Ideas of the soul, the world-whole, and God – and the Fichtean
Idea of the I, despite its purportedly pure-rational pedigree and avowedly regulative role,
is  not  in  any  obvious  way  a  member  of  that  Kantian  triad.  So  the  question  arises:
Concerning the nature of pure reason and the content and status of its supreme self-
wrought Idea, what exactly is Fichte’s position, and how might it represent “the Kantian
philosophy properly understood”? The issue is by no means merely scholastic, for it is
only in Kant’s rendering of reason (not of the understanding or of sensibility) that his
transcendental  model  of  mentality  provides  a  foundation  for  self-appointed
approximation  to  pure,  non-arbitrarily  self-legislated  optima,  and  thus  for  proactive
autonomy of a properly rational kind. Clearly these are major themes for Fichte also, but
it is much less clear whether his treatment of them is Kantian in anything more than its
basic inspiration. 
2 Below I argue that Fichte’s account of pure reason and its supreme self-wrought Idea is, in
its transcendental essentials, very much modeled on Kant’s. The key difference between
their  positions,  I  suggest,  is  simply  that  Fichte  operates  with  a  more  abstract
understanding of the transcendentally basic elements of finite rationality; consequently,
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he  arrives  at  a  conceptually  more  concentrated  understanding  of  pure  reason’s
preeminent Idea. In section one, I supply some context for that comparison. In section
two, I recount Fichte’s depiction of “the I as an Idea” and note some importantly related
concepts  and  claims.  In  section  three,  I  examine  a  pair  of  interestingly  different
approaches taken by Kant to understanding and identifying the Ideas engendered by
reason’s  basic  aims  and  operations.  Finally,  in  section  four,  I  suggest  that  the  Jena
Wissenschaftslehre reflects  Fichte’s  tacit  appropriation  of  the  transcendentally  more
fundamental of those two Kantian approaches.
 
1 Preliminaries
3 In Kant’s writings the term “reason” has both a generic and a more specialized sense.
Generically, reason is a capacity to originate and instate pure, non-arbitrary ordering
forms (cf. A11/B24). Such forms, however, are of more than one sort and function in more
than  one  way.  The  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding,  aka  the  categories,
informationally enrich and comprehendingly combine the given elements comprised by
any possible cognition (B143), including any cognition whereby discrete, putatively mind-
independent objects are apprehended (B160–1). An object, on this account, is “that in the
concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united” (B137), and the categories are
the basic forms of synthesis upon which all such unification depends. Consequently, “all
synthesis,  through  which  even  perception  itself  becomes  possible,  stands  under  the
categories,  and  since  experience  is  cognition  through  connected  perceptions,  the
categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and are thus also valid a priori of
all objects of experience” (B161).
4 By contrast, reason, in the specialized sense of “reason” that distinguishes this faculty
from the understanding,  works  in another  way and at a  higher  level.  The source of
unwavering, recognizably rational demands – the demand, for example, that things be
completely explained and the world optimally comprehended (A644–5/B672–3) – reason
also authors  Ideas  of  transcendent  entities  that  would have to exist,  were reality  so
configured  as  to  allow  for  the  complete  satisfaction  of  reason’s  self-wrought
requirements. Unlike the categories of the understanding, these Ideas of reason are not
constitutive of objects that we can experientially apprehend or verifiably cognize (ibid.).
Nevertheless, these Ideas play an indispensable regulative role, orienting the use of the
understanding by guiding us in our approximation to optima that reason upholds a priori
(A672/B700).
5 Thus,  while both the understanding and reason exhibit  intellectual  spontaneity,  only
reason’s operations provide for the more complex kind of  intellectual  autonomy: the
power of intelligence to independently author and authorize ends and, in so doing, to
determine itself to deploy its powers for the sake of those ends. To be sure, there is a
distinct  but  epistemologically  significant  sense  in  which  the  understanding  is
autonomous: it functions as a law unto itself in articulating a priori the basic categorial
structure of empirically cognizable nature (B163–5). Nevertheless, the basic operations
that make that possible (viz., syntheses) do not themselves comprise the setting of ends,
and the nonsensory notions deployed in those operations (viz., categories) are descriptive
concepts void of prescriptive import. Accordingly, autonomy, understood as fully-fledged
and strictly rational self-determination, must be rooted in activities of reason, as opposed
to operations of the understanding.i (Notably, Kant himself does not introduce the term
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“autonomy”  until  1785,  in  the  Groundwork,  where  it  principally  concerns  the
determination of the will by reason’s self-wrought law.) 
6 Understanding “reason” and “autonomy” in the senses just supplied, I would argue that
the autonomy of reason plays a transcendentally more radical role, and thus receives a
transcendentally more radical vindication, in the Jena Wissenschaftslehre than in Kant’s
Critiques.  By “more radical” here,  I  mean “concerning a more basic kind of  cognitive
accomplishment” – so that, for example, a transcendental argument premised upon the
possibility of truth-apt, object-directed, first-order cognition would be more radical than
one premised upon a higher-order propensity to further organize and elaborate upon
first-order  cognitions  in  some  specified  way.  In  Kant’s  theoretical  philosophy,  the
autonomy of reason is invoked in order to account for such higher-order propensities, as
well as various ideas to which those propensities give rise. It is not, however, invoked as
an enabling condition for empirical cognition per se, which (on Kant’s account) requires
only the categorial synthesis of passively registered appearances. In Fichte, by contrast,
the  autonomy  of  reason  –  specifically,  the  transcendental  subject’s  authoring  and
approximating to a recognizably rational ultimate goal: absolutely unrestricted rational
activity – is argued for as a necessary condition for the possibility of empirical cognition
in the Kantian sense. This is the position summed up in Fichte’s claim that “without a
striving, no object at all is possible” (SK, 233; GA I/2, 399). In this way, the autonomy of
reason is accorded a deeper transcendental foundation in Fichte’s philosophy than in
Kant’s.
7  A detailed defense of that contention would be more than this essay can accommodate.
Instead I shall support a related, more basic claim: that Fichte’s understanding of reason,
especially with respect to its final goal and its highest Idea, is substantially modeled on
Kant’s – in its transcendental deep-structure, of course, granted that the specifics of their
surface-level articulations diverge.
 
2 Fichte on the I as an Idea
8 Fichte states in the Second Introduction that the transcendental subject whose activities
the foundational portion of the Wissenschaftslehre isolates and explicates is a self-positing
subject to or for which “the I is present as an Idea” (IWL, 100; GA I/4, 266) – that is, not as
the object of an intuition or the topic of some discrete cognition, but instead as “the
ultimate aim of reason’s striving” (IWL, 101; GA I/4, 266): the end or optimum with and
toward which the rational subject, qua rational, orients itself. At no point is either the
transcendental  subject  (the  I)  or  the  transcendental  philosopher  (Fichte)  under  any
illusion that the indicated ideal is or even could be actual. “It will never become anything
real,” Fichte says. “Instead, it is only something to which we ought to draw infinitely
nearer” (ibid.). Although we can never completely coincide with this ideal, we can always
incrementally advance toward it, and pure reason prescribes unceasing endeavor to that
end: “The final end of a rational being necessarily lies in infinity; it is certainly not an end
that can ever be achieved, but it is one to which a rational being, in consequence of its
spiritual [geistigen] nature, is supposed to draw ceaselessly nearer and nearer” (SE, 142;
GA I/5, 141).
9 But what is the content of this irrevocable albeit unreachable ideal? The I as an Idea,
Fichte says, is “das VernunftWesen” (GA I/4, 266). This locution might be rendered as “the
essence of reason” or as “the rational being,” and both notions seem to be blended here:
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the I as an Idea is das Vernunftwesen “insofar as this being has completely succeeded in
exhibiting  universal  reason  within  itself,  has  actually  become  rational  through  and
through, and is nothing but rational. As such, it has ceased to be an individual, which it
was only because of the limitations of sensibility” (IWL, 100; GA I/4, 266). What is essential
to  rational  activity,  on  Fichte’s  account,  is  the  self-initiated  and  self-transparent
origination and instatement of pure ordering forms, chief among them a self-wrought but
essentially impersonal highest goal: “the self-sufficiency of all reason as such” (SE, 220;
GA  I/5,  209).  Relative  to  such  pure-rational  purposiveness,  the  individual’s  own
perspective, insofar as it is constituted by adventitious sensory and affective states, is
inessential and unimportant. “It is for I-hood [Ichheit] as such a contingent fact that I,
individual A, am precisely A” (ibid.). Thus, insofar as the I as an Idea “has actually become
rational  through and through,”  this  being neither identifies  with nor prioritizes  any
particular  persona  rooted  in  rationally-unbidden  empirical  givens.  Our  empirically
qualified individuality, on Fichte’s view, “is something merely accidental. Reason is the
end and personality is the means; the latter is merely a particular expression of reason,
one that must increasingly be absorbed into the universal form of the same” (IWL, 90; GA
I/4, 257–8).
10 Still, the adoption of a purely impersonal outlook and ethic cannot be all that it takes to
satisfy reason’s constitutive commitment to its own absolute self-sufficiency.
The I as an Idea is the rational being insofar as this being has also succeeded in
completely realizing reason outside of itself in the world, which thus also remains
posited within this Idea. The world remains in this Idea as a world as such, i.e., the
substrate along with these particular mechanical and organic laws; but these are
here geared completely toward exhibiting the final goal of reason. (IWL, 100–1; GA
I/4, 266)
11 Such a rational being has not only outgrown its earlier identification with an empirically
constricted personal perspective. It has also imposed rationally-mandated order upon all
that is of arational origin, by systematically comprehending it and dutifully reconfiguring
it. Thus, although this being still relates to a world outside of itself, it has so thoroughly
(and, as it were, impersonally) grasped and reworked the latter that “reason and reason
alone … have dominion in the sensible world” (SE, 262; GA I/5, 246). For the I as an Idea,
the  “entire  sensible  world,”  not  just  the  articulated  individual  body,  subsists  as  the
instrument and embodiment of pure reason’s purposes (SE, 217; GA I/5, 208). 
12 Note that Fichte sometimes depicts finite reason’s final goal in an even more unqualified
and rarefied way: as a mode of existence in which reason’s self-wrought purposes are not
at odds with the sensible world’s “mechanical and organic laws” because pure reason’s
order-inducing activities are not confronted with and qualified by any sensible states of
affairs whatsoever.  In the Second Introduction,  he states that the I  as an Idea “can be
exhibited only within the practical portion of philosophy, where it is shown to be the
ultimate aim of reason’s striving” (IWL, 101; GA I/4, 266). And in the practical portion of
the 1794/95 Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre, he says that “the meaning of the
principle,  das  Ich  setzt  sich  selbst  schlechthin,  first  becomes  wholly  clear”  only  with
reference to an Idea of the “absolute I” or “infinite I” (absolute Ich; unendlichen Ich) in the
light of which the I ought to “encompass all reality and exhaust the infinite” (SK, 244; GA
I/2, 409).ii It is “an absolute decree of reason,” Fichte says in the same text, that “finitude
itself must go; all bounds must fall away, and the infinite I must alone remain, as one and
all” (SK, 137–8; GA I/2, 301). I take it that if “all bounds must fall away,” then reason, as
the self-initiated  and  self-transparent  origination  and  instatement  of  pure  ordering
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forms, must cease to find its own purity and spontaneity confronted and qualified by the
opaque and unchosen givens that are constitutive of sensory or affective awareness and
thus productive of finite reason’s characteristic receptivity and reactivity.
13 Because  such  strong  statements  predate  those  quoted  above  from  the  1797  Second
Introduction,  we  might  suppose  that  in  the  intervening  time  Fichte’s  conception  of
reason’s final end was moderated or more adequately expressed.  With respect to the
above issue, however, this is not entirely clear. In the 1798 System of Ethics, for example,
Fichte says that “the complete annihilation of the individual and the fusion of the latter
into the absolutely pure form of reason or into God [in die absolut reine Vernunftform oder in
Gott] is indeed the ultimate goal of finite reason” (SE, 143; GA I/5, 142). And his view at
around this time is that God, unlike the I as an Idea, could not be subjectively situated
over  against a  sensible world  –  not  even  as  that  world’s  omnicomprehender  and
indomitable orderer. Instead, what he calls “God” just is a supersensible world order (IWL,
151; GA I/5, 354), where the intended sense of “order” does not principally denote an
already-accomplished  arrangement  (ordo  ordinatus)  but  signifies,  instead,  an  ongoing,
originative,  autonomous  ordering  (ordo  ordinans:  IWL,  160–1;  GA  I/6,  373–4).  “God,”
understood  as  die  absolut  reine  Vernunftform,  must  be  rational  activity –  the  self-
transparent,  self-initiated  origination  and instatement  of  ordering  form –  grounding
what there is and doing so in the light of its own (purely rational) decree as to what there
ought to be. Accordingly, this must be absolutely pure rational activity, not reactively
mastering  a  rationally-unbidden  mass  of  sensory  and  affective  manifestations,  but
proactively unfolding into a self-wrought supersensible order: a universe of purposively
evolving mental activity, not of nomologically constrained material conditions.iii
14 On the one hand, then, we have the I as an Idea: the supreme knower and reformer of a
sensible sphere with which rational being remains in relationship. (As noted above, “the
world  remains  in  this  Idea  as  a  world  as  such,  i.e.,  the  substrate  along  with  these
particular mechanical and organic laws...” (IWL, 100; GA I/4, 266).) And on the other hand,
it seems, we have “the absolutely pure form of reason,” unbeholden to empirical givens,
autonomously  articulating  itself  into  a  supersensible  array  of  self-transparent,  self-
initiated activities. Moreover, it seems that any transition from I-as-idea to absolutely
pure form would entail not only the aforementioned “annihilation of the individual,” qua
empirically-qualified personality, but also an end to experience as we know it: subjective
confrontation by adventitious appearings must cease – and, with this, the sensible world
must vanish – when “all bounds fall away” and only the absolutely pure form of reason
remains. And on Fichte’s view, as is well known, we “cannot think of personality and
consciousness apart from limitation and finitude” (IWL, 152; GA I/5, 355). 
15 Note, however, that this claim, properly understood, does not entail that the absolutely
pure form of reason must be void of any inner or mental life. Granted, rational activity’s
total  freedom  from  empirical  entanglements  would  preclude  the  specific  sort  of
consciousness  that  requires  and  arises  out  of  pure  activity’s  confrontation  by
adventitious manifestations: empirically circumscribed and perspectivally individualized
consciousness. But even as he underscores precisely that point, Fichte also argues that “as
regards content, divinity [Gottheit] is nothing but consciousness; it is intelligence, pure
intelligence, spiritual life and activity” – albeit of a sort that eludes exact comprehension
owing to its constitutive lack of limitations (AD, 178; GA I/6, 51). Note also his related,
roughly  contemporaneous  rendering  of  “infinite  reason”  as  an  end-directed
supersensible ordo ordinans (VM, 99; GA I/6, 284). Evidently, just as the Kantian categories,
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purified of their sensibly-schematized senses,  can still  articulate a range of thinkable
supersensible  structures  (B304–5),  so  pure  rational  acts,  free  of  entanglement  with
adventitious  arational  manifestations,  could  generate  and sustain an ideally  ordered,
indefinitely  complex  array  of  extrasensory  accomplishments.  Of  course,  such
considerations  are  not  supposed  to  constitute  epistemic  grounds  for  affirming  the
actuality or attainability of the absolutely pure form of reason, thus understood. Instead,
they concern only how we might best envision a certain rationally-mandated regulative
ideal.iv
16 But  do  we  have  just  one  regulative  ideal  here,  or  are  there two?  The  preceding
paragraphs  stress  some  interesting  differences  between  the  I  as  an  Idea  and  the
absolutely pure form of reason, as Fichte sometimes depicts them. But then again, in the
texts each of these is accorded what appears to be the same supreme standing, namely,
that of the “ultimate aim of reason’s striving” or “ultimate goal of finite reason.” (I take
the two expressions to be equivalent, because for Fichte, reason strives – in other words,
autonomously  undertakes  to  overcome impediments  to  its  insight  or  efficacy  –  only
because and insofar as it finds itself to be finite – that is, confronted by conditions not
authored by its  own activities.)  Thus the question arises whether the above exegesis
fabricates  or  exaggerates  differences  that  Fichte  himself  would  not  acknowledge  or
emphasize. And there seem to be pertinent considerations pointing in both directions.
17 For one,  the basic  criteria in the light  of  which the two notions appear importantly
distinct – roughly: (i) empirically conditioned, thus partly receptive and reactive, versus
(ii) absolutely unconditioned, thus perfectly pure and proactive – are categories that play
a  fundamental  organizing role  in  Fichte’s  philosophy,  going all  the  way back to  the
innovations  of  the  Aenesidemus  review  (EPW,  75;  GA  I/2,  65).  Thus  the  separation
suggested above, which distinguishes the I as an Idea from reason’s absolutely pure form,
reflects a distinction that has major philosophical significance for Fichte. However, there
may be reasons for doubting the distinction’s applicability in this instance. In the light of
Fichte’s  epistemology,  it  is  questionable  whether  anything like  experience  (as  Fichte
understands it) is possible relative to the subjective situation (if it can be called that) of
the I as an Idea. And if the I as an Idea should prove to be insusceptible of experience,
then it  is unclear why we should not envision it  as having already accomplished the
striven-for “fusion … into the absolutely pure form of reason or into God.” In that case, “I
as  Idea” and “absolutely  pure form of  reason,”  while  possibly  differing in intension,
would actually denote one and the same optimum.
18 To sketch the related reasoning: On Fichte’s account of the essential inseparability of
thinking and willing, the transcendental subject cannot find itself compelled to cognize
an extra-subjective situation unless it finds its pure-rational aspiration to absolute self-
sufficiency  somehow contested  or  checked.  But  can  the  I  as  an  Idea find  itself  thus
frustrated?  This  may  appear  doubtful,  insofar  as  Fichte  states  that  such  an  I’s  self-
sufficiency should involve “everything that I will to occur in my entire sensible world
occurring purely and simply because I will for it to occur – just as happens in my body”
(SE, 217; GA I/5, 208). This makes it unclear whether, and if so how, such an I would still
be encumbered by “representations accompanied by the feeling of necessity” (IWL, 8; GA
I/4, 186) – in which case it is unclear why or how the I as Idea should still have anything
like experience, as Fichte conceives of the latter. 
19 Nevertheless, I suggest that the I as an Idea is best understood to be subjectively situated
in such a way as still to undergo experience of a sort. This I, it seems, still has a sensible
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world – underscore “sensible.” In consequence,  even though that world,  at  this ideal
limit, is one in which no object or event can elude reason’s comprehension or thwart
reason’s aim, still,  the very sensory presence to consciousness of such a world must be
understood, in the light of Fichte’s epistemology, to betoken a persistent limitation of the
I’s free activity. This might very well be the very last such limitation, so to say, before
that threshold (or “fusion”) at which “all bounds must fall away, and the infinite I must
alone remain, as one and all” (SK, 138; GA I/2, 301). Nonetheless, it remains a limitation,
because for Fichte, any sensation of some putatively extra-subjective state of affairs goes
back to some sheer “feeling” that is not posited through, and that remains recalcitrant in
relation to, the I’s self-initiated rational activities (cf. IWL, 75; GA I/4, 242–3). On Fichte’s
transcendental  epistemology,  it  is  just  such  recalcitrance  which  underpins  and
eventuates in experience. 
20 I  take  it,  then,  that  the  I  as  Idea  is  the  rational  being  that,  having  “succeeded  in
completely  realizing  reason  outside  of  itself  in  the  world”  (IWL,  100;  GA  I/4,  266;  my
emphasis), nonetheless still finds itself subjectively situated over against an experienced
objectivity, as distinct from the freely self-wrought and perfectly self-transparent ideal
order that would be the expression of reason’s absolutely pure form. Such a rational
existence  remains  empirically  conditioned  – to  the  minimum  conceivable  degree,
perhaps,  but still  sufficiently so to confine it  to this  side (our side)  of  the boundary
beyond which lies  reason’s  absolutely pure form alone.  For Fichte,  the absolute self-
sufficiency  for  which  the  rational  being  finally  strives  requires  “absolute
indeterminability through anything outside” of rational being as such (SE, 61; GA I/5, 70).
Accordingly, I take it that “I as an Idea” and “absolutely pure form of reason” stand for
intimately related but ultimately distinct ideals. 
21 Further considerations supporting such a reading issue straightforwardly from Fichte’s
first principles, insofar as the latter entail that “without a striving, no object at all is
possible” (SK, 233; GA I/2, 399). On this account, the subject’s countenancing of something
other than its own states and acts – that is, the I’s positing of the not-I – presupposes and
subserves a transcendentally prior end-directedness. Because the end in question is an
end commitment to which precedes and prompts the I’s positing of the not-I, that end
cannot itself be – but nonetheless might entail, as a specification or subordinate goal – the
complete conquest of the not-I by the I. Accordingly, pure-rational activity as such, the
transcendentally most basic instance of which is the I’s sheer positing of itself,  must
somehow contain or constitute commitment to an even more radical form of rational
self-sufficiency, one that surpasses even such independence as would be achieved upon
the completed conquest of the not-I by the I – or via the rational mastery of the sensible
world  by  the  I  as  an  Idea.  And what  could  that  more radical  form of  rational  self-
sufficiency consist in, other than pure-rational activity’s permanent disengagement from
all adventitious empirical manifestation? As Fichte phrases this in 1799, it is “the goal of
our entire existence and all of our acting – a goal that is indeed never to be reached but is
to be unceasingly promoted – that rational being become absolutely and entirely free,
self-sufficient, and independent of everything that is not itself reason” (AD, 101; GA I/5, 426;
my emphasis). Viewed from this angle, it appears that finite rational being’s inherent
ultimate goal must be complete coincidence with the absolutely pure form of reason – an
accomplishment of which even the I as an Idea, per the analysis above, falls short.
22 But where does all of this leave us? If the I as an Idea and the absolutely pure form of
reason  are  best  not  conflated,  how  then  are  we  to  understand  Fichte’s  apparent
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inclination to equate them by according supreme standing to each? And what has any of
this got do to with Kant?
 
3 Kantian routes to Ideas of reason
23 The Kantian framework for identifying and interrelating pure reason’s Ideas and ends
suggests one way in which we might begin to clarify this picture. As I further explain
below, in the Kantian context, an Idea of reason always derives from some basic end of
reason, as a way of envisioning the satisfaction of some condition on said end’s eventual
realization. If we approach Fichte’s position as this schema suggests, then we may say
that for the Jena Wissenschaftslehre, (i) fusion into reason’s absolutely pure form is the
self-imposed final goal of finite rational activity as such, and (ii) the I as an Idea indicates
the  optimum  of  I-hood  (Ichheit)  attainable  by  the  rational  being  qua  finite:  the
penultimate  (not  ultimate)  rational  accomplishment  short  of  the  perfectly  purified,
absolutely unconditioned ‘divinity’ (Gottheit) of die absolut reine Vernunftform.  If  that is
correct,  then the I as  an Idea serves  as  a  kind of  avatar  for  an ideal  whose further
independence from basic  limitations locates  it  outside of  the finite-rational  frame of
reference  altogether.  In  that  case,  we  can  understand  Fichte’s  tendency  to  identify
reason’s highest goal  with now one and then the other as a result  of  context-driven
decisions to take up different angles on the project proper to pure reason. One angle
homes  in  on the  highest  goal  of  finite  rational  activity  qua  rational,  as  said  goal  is
disclosed to higher-order transcendental reflection – namely, as complete coincidence
with the absolutely pure form of reason. The other angle, which emphasizes the I as Idea,
focuses instead on the first-order perspective of the finite rational being, for whom that
goal  makes itself  manifest  via a relatively indeterminate regulative representation of
maximal rational self-sufficiency.
24 The question now is whether the above appeal to a Kantian prototype is supported by
anything  other  than  such  schematic  considerations.  Why  suppose  that  Fichte  is
consciously taking inspiration from Kant’s approach? Why then does he not also discuss
syllogistic form, transcendental illusion, and so forth? I address these questions below,
but first,  a disclaimer:  My aim is not to offer any especially exact or comprehensive
rendering of Kant’s account of reason’s ends and Ideas.v Instead, my aim is merely to
descry in his writings some key ideas and characteristic approaches that we might then
see to be importantly implicated in Fichte’s philosophy.
25 In the first Critique, Kant argues that the purest and most authoritative of reason’s self-
wrought Ideas (i) are three in number, (ii) are importantly affiliated with the three basic
syllogistic forms undergirded by the three pure categories of relation, and (iii) tend to
engender a type of “transcendental illusion” in which we mistake projected ideals for
apprehended  actualities.  Obviously  such  claims  have  no  clear  echoes  in  the  Jena
Wissenschaftslehre.  Still, we should consider how exactly Kant arrives at this position –
and, in particular, how he proposes to identify and understand reason’s key Ideas. 
26 For Kant, “rational being is distinguished from the rest of nature by this, that it sets itself
an end” (GMM 86, AK 4:437).vi With respect to “reason’s speculative interest” specifically
(A676/B704),  the  end  in  question  is  all-encompassing  and  ideally  systematic
comprehension, the achievement of which would satisfy the “need of reason” to “bring
the highest possible unity of reason into our cognition” (A309/B365). To do so would
require,  among  other  things,  that  reason  “find  the  unconditioned  for  conditioned
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cognitions of the understanding” (A307/B364), which discovery would (with respect to
the relevant object-domain) effect the systematic closure that reason seeks in its quest
for ever more-complete explanations – in particular, by uncovering something that (i)
explains the facts for which further grounds are sought and, crucially, (ii) itself stands in
no need of explanation, being absolutely basic, all-embracing, or independent in a way
that obviates any further inquiry. No object of empirical cognition could ever possess that
status,  so the rational  requirement to “find the unconditioned” refers us beyond the
bounds of experience and invites us to envision some transcendent entity or entities that
answer to that demand (A327/B384). Enter the Ideas of reason: pure notions, originated a
priori,  describing  entities  that  transcend  possible  experience  and  that,  relative  to
reason’s essential ends, ought to exist, for the reason that their actual existence would be
a  necessary  condition  for  the  possible  completion  of  a  project  that  is  integral  to
rationality as such.
27 But why “Ideas” in the plural? By what route does Kant arrive at distinct Ideas – not to
mention insistent illusions – of God, the world-whole, and the soul, if his starting point is
simply reason’s aspiration to uncover the unconditioned? One answer, put as briefly as
possible,  is  this:  Reason demands ever  more-complete  explanations,  and the  logic  of
explanation is essentially syllogistic. Syllogisms come in three basic forms, underwritten
by the three pure categories of relation (A323/B379). Accordingly, explanation comes in
three different forms: explanation in terms of ontological inherence, in terms of lawful
dependence,  and  in  terms  of  systematic  interconnection  (ibid.).  In  consequence,  the
unconditioned that reason seeks takes three distinct shapes: “a subject that is no longer a
predicate … a presupposition that presupposes nothing further, and … an aggregate of
members of a division such that nothing further is required” (A323/B379–80). On this
basis, Kant claims, we can see how
reason, exclusively through the synthetic use of the same function it employs in the
categorical syllogism, must necessarily come to the concept of the absolute unity of
the thinking subject, how the logical procedure in hypothetical syllogisms [leads to]
the ideas of the absolutely unconditioned in a series of given conditions, and finally
how  the  mere  form  of  the  disjunctive  syllogism  necessarily  carries  with  it  the
highest rational concept of a being of all beings…. (A335–6/B392–3)
28 Moreover,  Kant  maintains,  because  these  three  Ideas  are  (on  this  model)  so  tightly
enmeshed with the basic ways in which we make (properly rational) sense of things, it
becomes  difficult  to  resist  the  resulting,  inexplicit  intimation  that  we  possess  non-
sensory surety of the indicated entities’ actuality – especially insofar as we (precipitately)
suppose that the world really does totally make sense: something that is indeed assumed,
but by no means guaranteed, by reason’s unceasing insistence that we work toward total
understanding. Ergo “transcendental illusion,” in which a priori projections reflecting
reason’s ideals (A674/B672) are misconstrued as non-sensory apprehensions of objective
actualities (A297–8/B353–4).
29 At this point it may seem as if Fichte’s position has faded completely from view. However,
the above considerations, although textually preponderant in the Critique,  are not the
only grounds,  nor the most enduring ones,  on the basis of  which Kant identifies the
purest and most authoritative of reason’s self-wrought Ideas. He also has a separate and
longer-lived line of argument,vii still deployed in the Critique, which does not seek to graft
those  Ideas  onto  categorially-circumscribed  syllogistic  forms  and  which,  because  it
bypasses  that  explanatory  machinery,  lends  much  less  support  to  his  later  claims
concerning the inevitability and tenacity of transcendental illusion.viii Below I propose
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that Fichte appropriates and adapts this approach,  which,  in Kant’s  application of  it,
derives the triplicity of reason’s transcendental Ideas not from the three categories of
relation, and so on, but from the threefold elementary articulation of reason’s unchosen
informational environment. Here is the Critique’s version of this device:
Now what is universal in every relation that our representations can have is 1) the
relation to the subject, 2) the relation to objects, and indeed either as appearances,
or as objects of thinking in general…. Now all pure concepts have to do generally
with  the  synthetic  unity  of  representations,  but  concepts  of  pure  reason
(transcendental  ideas)  have to  do with the unconditioned synthetic  unity  of  all
conditions in general. Consequently, all transcendental ideas will be brought under
three classes,  of which the first contains the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the
thinking subject, the second the absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance,
the third the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general. (A333–
4/B390 –1)
30 As  noted  above,  theoretical  reason has  as  its  final  goal  perfected  comprehension:  it
demands ideally complete explanation and aims to connect all well-founded cognitions
within a system whose ideal articulation reflects reason’s absolute imperative to effect
optimal  intelligibility.  The  design  of  this  system and the  accordant  direction  of  our
cognitive projects is reason’s autonomous accomplishment. But the ensuing pure-rational
project can actually unfold only within a given informational environment, and on the
model  outlined  above,  this  environment  has  a  threefold  basic  articulation  that
differentiates and relates (i) the experiencing subject, (ii) things considered as they are
experienced by that subject, and (iii) things considered as they are in general. As a result,
reason’s essentially unitary project – that of systematically accounting for everything – is
diffracted,  as  it  were,  into  three  lines  of  inquiry  with  distinct  domains.  And  in
consequence,  reason  projects  three  transcendental  Ideas,  representing  transcendent
entities  each  of  which  would  have  to  exist,  were  everything  in  each  domain  to  be
optimally comprehensible. These are Ideas of the soul as a unitary enduring substance, of
the sensible world as a unitary and comprehensively configured whole, and of a “being of
all  beings”  as  the  one  unconditioned  source  of  all  things  in  their  systematic
interconnection (A334/B391).
31 Below I propose that Fichte tacitly appropriates and adapts this diffraction model (as I will
call it) in his own treatment of the ends and Ideas of pure reason. First, the better to
prepare that comparison, we should also outline the relationship between reason’s ends
and Ideas in Kant’s practical philosophy. Here, the end which, “given by reason alone,
must hold equally for all rational beings” (GMM 78, AK 4:427), is the goal of optimized
autonomy:  the  ideal  arrangement  or  “highest  good”  in  which  (i)  each  individual
autonomously  commits  to  the  autonomy  of  rational  beings  in  general,  and  (ii)
consequently all individuals succeed in self-actualization to the greatest extent possible
consistent with the same for all others.ix In us, however, commitment to this rationally
self-legislated  end  is  constantly  contested  by  arational  inclinations;  thus,  reason’s
intrinsic commitment to optimized autonomy manifests itself  to the individual  as an
authoritative  ethical  directive,  addressed  to  the  inclination-prone  will  of  a  being
enmeshed in and causally conditioned by an amoral natural order. Reason thereby places
us under a demand that can be fully satisfied only if certain basic conditions obtain –
namely  (on  Kant’s  view)  only  if  one’s  will  is  essentially  free  and  one’s  personality
immortal, and only if there exists a guarantor (aka God) that the moral perfection of each
would issue in the successful self-actualization of all. Consequently, in this connection
also, pure reason upholds Ideas of the soul, the world-whole, and God – not in this case as
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projections  orienting  a  theoretical  quest  for  perfect  comprehension,  but  instead  as
postulates  underwriting  an  ethical  project  of  optimal  self-actualization.x We  can  in
principle obtain no evidence for (or against) the real being of the entities thus postulated,
but we remain under an unconditional rational requirement to assent to their existence:
the evidence is,  necessarily,  silent  on that  question,  and reason as  such categorically
demands our complete commitment to a goal that is attainable only on the supposition
that the indicated states of affairs obtain.  Thus the Ideas that eventuate accordingly,
while they do not add to our stock of warranted cognitions, still crucially contribute to
reason’s  regulation  of  our  conduct,  by  framing  the  basic  outlook  that  sustains  our
essential vocation. Whether that vocation’s final goal actually is attainable must remain
unknown – but we cannot renounce it without renouncing reason itself, at least on Kant’s
(and Fichte’s) conception of the latter as inherently oriented by requirements that derive
from the highest of the ends that it sets for itself.
32 In the Kantian context, then – whether theoretical or practical – an Idea of reason is a
nonsensory representation,  elaborated a  priori,  of  an entity  that  transcends  possible
experience and that, relative to pure reason’s ultimate ends, ought to exist, in the sense
that its actual existence would be a necessary condition for the eventual (not so say
assured) completion of a project that is integral to reason as such. An Idea of reason is not
itself,  immediately,  a  representation  of  any  final  goal  of  reason,  but  its  descriptive
content  and  regulative  function  derive  from and  depend  upon  reason’s  constitutive
commitment to some ultimate end.  Reason’s highest  aim in the theoretical  sphere is
perfected comprehension, and in the practical sphere, optimized autonomy – but in each
of these two contexts, reason’s self-wrought supreme goal undergoes a kind of diffraction
or differentiation at  the interface with reason’s  unchosen environment,  and Ideas of
reason multiply accordingly. 
 
4 The Fichtean route to the I as an Idea
33 I suggest that in thinking about pure reason’s ends and the associated Ideas, Fichte tacitly
takes over Kant’s diffraction model – but with the important difference that (i) Fichte
feeds into the model a more rarefied and unitary conception of reason’s highest goal, and
(ii) Fichte fits out the model with a more abstract understanding of the basic character of
reason’s unchosen environment. In consequence there eventuates, from the interface of
reason’s highest self-wrought goal with its unbidden empirical impediments, only a single
supremely  pure  and  authoritative  Idea:  the  I  as  an  Idea.xi Nevertheless,  the  model
employed and the refinements applied by Fichte have solid foundations in Kant’s earlier
work.
34 Consider Fichte’s own conception of pure reason’s ultimate end. In this connection, he
states in the nova methodo that Kant
speaks of an interest of speculative reason and an interest of practical reason and
opposes these two to each other. From the perspective of Kant’s philosophy this is
correct, but it is not correct in itself; for reason is always one and has only one
interest. The interest of reason lies in confidence in one’s own self-sufficiency and
freedom, and reason’s interest in unity and coherence is a consequence of this prior
interest. One could call the latter “the interest of speculative reason”…. (FTP, 95; GA
IV/3, 335)
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35 As we saw above,  on Kant’s  account reason operates with two interestingly different
ultimate goals: perfected comprehension and optimized autonomy. And as we can see in
this passage, Fichte retains Kant’s basic conception of reason as essentially end-directed,
while  rejecting  his  theoretical/practical  dualism,  instead  embracing  a  conception  of
reason as essentially unitary and, accordingly, as always oriented by and toward some
single self-wrought goal: “reason is always one and has only one interest,” which is here
depicted in terms of “self-sufficiency and freedom.” As we saw above, however, it is not
the  self-sufficiency  and  freedom  of  any  empirically  individuated  persona  that  is
ultimately at issue. But then what exactly does Fichte have in mind here, and how does
his thinking connect up with Kant’s? 
36 One way to get clearer on this might be to ask ourselves (as Fichte seems to have asked
himself):  What do perfect  comprehension and optimized autonomy have in common,
such  that  both could  be  unconditionally  mandated  based  on  one final  end  that  is
autonomously  upheld  by  an  ultimately  unitary,  essentially  nondual  power  of  pure
reason? We can approach this question by considering in a general way what it would be,
in principle, for each of the two highest goals countenanced by Kant to be achieved.
37 Beginning with theoretical  reason,  then,  we might say:  Perfect comprehension would
consist in reason’s having induced an optimal organization of all well-founded cognitions,
via the implementation of certain self-legislated directives and the accordant articulation
of an array of organizing non-sensory notions. The sort of optimal organization aimed at
here  is  perfect  systematicity,  such that  all  given phenomena are  rendered fully  and
finally intelligible in the most comprehensive and illuminating way. The self-legislated
directives implemented to that end are the regulative principles of reason’s theoretical
employment:  “to  find  the  unconditioned  for  conditioned  cognitions  of  the
understanding”  (A307/B364),  and  so  forth.  And  the  organizing  non-sensory  notions
articulated on that basis include the key Ideas of reason – God, the world-whole, and the
soul – as regulative representations: orienting projections (not warranted cognitions) of
transcendent beings the (uncertain) existence of which would make possible the world’s
optimal intelligibility.
38 Next,  regarding  practical  reason,  we  might  say:  Optimized  autonomy  would  involve
reason’s  having  induced  an  optimal  coordination  of  all  particular  volitions,  via  the
implementation of certain self-legislated directives and the accordant articulation of an
array of organizing non-sensory notions. The sort of optimal organization aimed at here
is a systematic maximization of rational self-determination, such that all rational beings
act out of unconditional respect for autonomy as such and, as a result, enjoy as much
success in free self-actualization as is possible consistent with the same for all others. The
self-legislated  directives  implemented  to  that  end  are  the  various  versions  of  the
categorical imperative. And the organizing non-sensory notions articulated on that basis
include the key Ideas  of  reason –  God,  the world-whole,  and the soul  –  as  practical
postulates:  transcendent  beings  whose  existence  we  can  rationally  affirm  because,
although our evidence is and must be silent on that question, such beings must exist if it
is to be genuinely possible for us to achieve the in-principle optimum of autonomy to
which reason as such unconditionally commits us.
39 Understood along something like the above lines, Kant’s separate accounts of theoretical
and practical reason seem to point toward the existence of a single, ultimate form of
rational activity that has a single highest goal.xii In both the theoretical and the practical
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spheres,  reason  gives  the  rational  being  the  end  of  inducing  an  optimal  ordering,
according to  standards  of  optimality  that  reason itself  authors  a  priori,  and via  the
application of more specific ordering principles that reason itself  articulates.  In both
spheres, then, reason is as the origination and application of pure ordering forms, chief among
them a self-legislated supreme end of complete (optimal, unqualified, absolute) rational ordering.
This end would be the transcendentally purest and normatively highest of reason’s self-
wrought ordering forms, such that “the goal of our entire existence and all of our acting
…  [is]  that  rational  being  become  absolutely  and  entirely  free,  self-sufficient,  and
independent  of  everything that  is  not  itself  reason” (AD,  101;  GA I/5,  426).  Rational
activity in its absolutely pure form ought, in the end, to be all in all – the final goal, on the
path  toward  which  the  I  as  an  Idea  (per  the  analysis  in  section  2)  represents  the
penultimate step.
40 But then what accounts for reason’s seeming differentiation into distinctly theoretical
and practical  forms? Kant’s  diffraction model,  imported into this  context,  supports a
straightforward answer:  Reason’s originally undifferentiated ultimate commitment (to
absolute, unqualified, optimal ordering via pure, self-wrought forms) is, at its interface
with  the  empirical,  confronted  and  qualified  by  rationally-unbidden  givens  of  two
distinct kinds, the concrete qualitative character of which is, in each case (and from the
standpoint of transcendental philosophy) absolutely contingent. Some of these arational
factors are such that their opacity and recalcitrance vis-à-vis the self-transparency and
spontaneity of rational activity confront the active intelligence with a mass of given facts.
By contrast, some unbidden givens are such as to subject the rational being’s pure power
of self-determination to a kind of pressure or prompting not authored by that power
itself:  adventitious  inclination.  On  this  model,  then,  rational  activity  takes  on  a
specifically theoretical or ethical cast (categorial articulation or normative evaluation)
only in relation to the specific sort of occlusion or interference that contingently comes
between reason and its self-legislated supreme end of absolutely unrestricted rational
ordering. Thus it is a certain duality in the basic modes of arational manifestation that
grounds reason’s dual specialization in theoretical explanation and ethical orientation.
“All of man’s powers,” on Fichte’s account, “in themselves constitute but one power and
are distinguished from each other merely in their application to different objects” (EPW,
149; GA I/3, 30).
41 As  we  saw  above,  Kant’s  thinking  appears  to  embody  separate  applications  of  the
diffraction model to each of two foundationally-unintegrated ultimate goals of rational
activity:  on the theoretical  side,  perfected comprehension,  and on the practical  side,
optimized autonomy. Each of these ends is then further subjected to a kind of triple
specification, as a result of the threefold basic articulation of rational activity’s unchosen
environment, per Kant’s conception thereof. On the theoretical side, the aspiration to
complete comprehension finds itself  faced with three distinct topics:  the subject,  the
world of appearances, and things in general. And on the practical side, the aspiration to
optimized autonomy confronts three key challenges: effacing inclination, escaping full
prior causation, and ensuring an optimal final situation. Consequently, reason can clearly
envision the demanded completion of its own basic tasks (and in that way help to guide
us toward said completion) only by abstractly modeling the indicated range of object-
domains a priori – that is, only by elaborating multiple Ideas that serve that very purpose.
For Fichte, by contrast, reason engenders its ultimate Idea not so that we might (as in the
Kantian case) better model an order of things within which we are pictured as already
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embedded, but instead, simply so as to sustain our constant (if only tacit) recognition
that, as finite rational beings, we are continually called upon to increase reason’s freedom
and extend reason’s reach. “Ideas,” for Fichte, “are problems or tasks for thinking, and
they occur in our consciousness only to the extent that we are able to comprehend at
least this task” (SE, 67; GA I/5, 75).
42 In the light of this and similar passages,xiii it  appears that for Fichte,  Ideas represent
principles and possibilities that fundamentally condition but finally surpass the entire
finite-rational frame of reference. As such, Ideas are rationally and/or philosophically
indispensable,  even though their objects are only vaguely comprehensible.  In closing,
then, a related remark on the topic of illusion, which is a major theme in Kant that has no
distinct echo in Fichte. Fichte’s silence on this score should not surprise us, given the
content of reason’s highest Idea on his own account. After all, the I as an Idea can fulfill its
orienting function only insofar as it is, in a sense (and for each of us), an idea of me – that
is, of who, or better yet how, I, as a rational being, am finally called upon to be. But this Idea
simultaneously demands from me a ‘me’ that, through my own effortful endeavor, has
been purified and perfected to such a degree as to appear impossibly remote from my
current condition – and indeed from any foreseeable moment in a life like mine, given
that I am constantly called upon to manage unbidden sensations and master arational
motivations.  Thus  there  is  no  question  of  my  somehow  mistaking  my  pure-rational
orientation via the I-as-an-Idea for an exact extrasensory identification of anything that I
could  rationally  regard  as  real.  On  the  contrary:  this  Idea  ordinarily  fulfills  its  role
precisely via its obscure but insistent indication that “my goal lies in infinity, because my
dependence is infinite” (SE, 143; GA I/5, 141).xiv
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ABSTRACTS
In this paper, I argue that Fichte’s account of pure reason and its supreme self-wrought Idea is, in
its transcendental essentials, very much modeled on Kant’s. The key difference between their
positions, I suggest, is simply that Fichte operates with a more abstract understanding of the
transcendentally basic elements of finite rationality; consequently, he arrives at a conceptually
more concentrated understanding of  pure reason’s  preeminent Idea.  In section one,  I  supply
some context for that comparison. In section two, I recount Fichte’s depiction of “the I as an
Idea” and note some importantly related concepts and claims. In section three, I examine a pair
of interestingly different approaches taken by Kant to understanding and identifying the Ideas
engendered by reason’s basic aims and operations. Finally, in section four, I suggest that the Jena
Wissenschaftslehre reflects Fichte’s tacit appropriation of the transcendentally more fundamental
of those two Kantian approaches.
Fichte and Kant on Reason’s Final Ends and Highest Ideas
Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte, 16 | 2018
15
INDEX




Fichte and Kant on Reason’s Final Ends and Highest Ideas
Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte, 16 | 2018
16
